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COLLEGE ATHLETES IN REVENUE-GENERATING SPORTS AS 
EMPLOYEES: A LOOK INTO THE ALT-LABOR FUTURE 
ROBERTO L. CORRADA ©* 
The writing is on the wall. In the next few years, it seems clear now 
that at least the elite student athletes in Division I power conferences in 
college football and basketball, revenue-generating sports programs, will 
be deemed employees for the purpose of determining college and 
university legal obligations toward them. The inevitability of this sea 
change in the way these athletes are viewed will be the culminating result 
of various lawsuits as well as state legislation under a myriad of labor, 
employment, and antitrust laws. The two most visible of these lawsuits so 
far, O’Bannon v. NCAA1 and Northwestern University,2 quietly avoided the 
direct question whether student athletes involved in the litigation were 
employees when in each case a finding that they were students and not 
employees would have resolved their claims and ended the litigation.3 It 
seems painfully evident in these two cases, as will be demonstrated in this 
article, that the court in O’Bannon and the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB) in Northwestern felt strongly that the student athletes involved 
must in fact be employees or sufficiently employee-like to stay away from 
a directly confronting the issue. Despite these developments, however, 
courts still accept the argument that even elite student athletes are amateurs 
and students, and not therefore employees. Although plaintiff-athletes have 
* This article was invited for publication in the Chicago-Kent Law Review as part of a November 2019 
Symposium on Alt-Labor. Roberto L. Corrada is Professor of Law and Mulligan Burleson Chair in 
Modern Learning, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author thanks the Chicago-Kent 
Law Review staff and all of the participants in the Alt-Labor Symposium, Michelle Penn, Sturm 
College of Law Faculty Service Librarian for her invaluable and efficient assistance, and Russell 
Kalvelage and Rebekah Nickel for their excellent research assistance, especially with respect to 
portions of this article involving work study programs and the O’Bannon case. 
 1.  O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon II), 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 2.  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015). 
 3.  In O’Bannon the court expressly stated that elite student athletes were in a labor market and 
that the nature of the relationship between the athletes and their colleges was a transactional relationship 
anticipating economic gain on both sides. O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1065. In Northwestern University
the NLRB assumed arguendo that the students were employees and then declined to assert jurisdiction 
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so far mostly lost in federal litigation, it seems clear that cases will 
continue to be brought and that eventually these college athletes will 
prevail because the amateur ideal of the college athlete at the very least in 
sports that generate substantial revenue for schools is crumbling and 
unsustainable at the same time that various legal tests of employee status as 
well as simple economic reality reveal these athletes are truly employees.4
More recent evidence of erosion in amateur status is found in state 
legislation requiring that these athletes be allowed direct payment for use of 
name, image, and likeness (NIL) by commercial entities.5 After California 
passed a law in September, and Florida threatened to pass the same law in 
late October, the NCAA yielded to pressure and announced that it will 
allow student athletes to receive NIL payments.6
The current landscape of labor, employment, and antitrust litigation 
involving mostly elite college athletes in revenue-generating sports 
represents a piecemeal approach to vindicating these students’ rights as 
employees. As the NCAA’s primary defense that these particular athletes 
are in fact amateurs falls apart, nobody has really focused on the perhaps 
more interesting and fundamental question about what it will mean for 
these students to be viewed as employees. How will their lives be changed? 
Will they be able to retain an identity as a student? How will expectations 
 4.  See Richard T. Karcher, Big Time College Athletes’ Status as Employees, 33 A.B.A. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 31, 53 (2018) (“The Regional Director’s findings in Northwestern University and the NLRB’s 
decision on review (declining jurisdiction without explicitly reversing the Regional Director) suggest 
that Berger may have been decided differently if the plaintiffs were scholarship athletes in revenue 
sports. In other words, Northwestern University strongly supports the position that scholarship athletes 
in revenue sports are employees under the FLSA, even if non-scholarship athletes in non-revenue sports 
are not university employees under the FLSA ‘economic reality’ test.”). 
 5.  Steve Berkowitz, California Assembly Passes Bill that Brings State to Verge of Rules 
Showdown with NCAA, USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/09/09/california-assembly-bill-allows-college-athletes-
use-likeness/2269869001/ [https://perma.cc/G6YG-CNGF]; Jeremy Bauer Wolf, One Step Closer to 
Pay for College Athletes, INSIDE HIGHER ED., (Sept. 11, 2019.), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/11/california-passes-bill-allowing-athletes-be-paid-
name-image-and-likeness [https://perma.cc/GX5A-UX3T]. The California law goes into effect in 2023.
 6.  See Bobby Caina Calvan, Florida following California’s example, DENVER POST (Oct. 25, 
2019), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/the-denver-post/20191025/281947429636251 
[https://perma.cc/R9YU-TKPG]. The Florida proposed legislation is modelled after California’s. Id.
The biggest football states are likely to follow since none of them wants to cede a recruiting advantage. 
Indeed, as this article was going to print, substantial NIL Bills had been introduced in Arizona, 
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The NCAA was quick to change course after 
the possibility of Florida legislation was announced. See Ralph D. Russo, NCAA Allows profit for 
athletes, but lots of questions remain, DENVER POST (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.pressreader.com/usa 
/the-denver-post/20191030/281943134678345 [https://perma.cc/UP6D-72RR]. The NCAA Board of 
Governors will allow student athletes to receive pay for use of their NIL. Id. However, the NCAA 
Board “is emphasizing that change must be consistent with the values of college sports and higher 
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change in the college field of play and in the locker room as a result of their 
new status as employees who happen also to be students? What about 
students in non-power conferences who might still be viewed as students 
and amateur athletes? How will employee athletes be paid by colleges and 
universities, and what will that mean with respect to the level of control 
colleges and universities have over them? Will collective bargaining take 
place in college, and, if it does, what will it look like? Will it be undertaken 
on a national basis, a conference basis, or in individual schools? What will 
student athlete employees and colleges and universities bargain over? In 
attempting to answer these questions, this article will explore the brave new 
alt-labor world of college football and basketball “employees” in revenue-
generating sports. 
This article will begin by looking at some current and recent litigation 
brought by college athletes against their respective universities as well as 
recent state legislation that may affect their status as employees. Part I will 
focus on what the courts, agencies, scholars, and state legislators have said 
or implied about whether these athletes are or should be employees under 
the law. This Part will demonstrate why the designation of athletes in 
revenue-generating sports is fragile and cannot endure for much longer. 
Part II switches and focuses on college “work study” programs, showing in 
fact that there is nothing unusual or strange about having students work as 
“employees” in college, and then showing how work study can serve as an 
effective template for structuring the relationship between a college or 
university and its football or basketball players. This Part shows that 
colleges have very little to fear by treating these elite student athletes as 
employees, and that such a transition can actually be a relatively easy one. 
This Part explains how colleges and universities can treat these student-
athletes as employees for work study programs by a minor change in 
Department of Labor Regulations. Part III will take a look at how collective 
bargaining in college might happen, what are likely to be the subjects of 
bargaining, and why, in fact, union organizing and collective bargaining 
rights for athletes in revenue-generating sports will be critical in the new 
alt-labor world of college athlete employment. 
Importantly, this article maintains only that student athletes in revenue 
generating sports should be (and will be) classified as employees. 
Generally, this means men’s college football and basketball players who 
are grant-in-aid scholarship recipients on teams in Division I Power 5 
Conferences.7 It is precisely because these sports generate substantial 
 7.  The analysis in this article mainly focuses on football players in the FBS Division I Power 5 
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revenue for schools that schools invariably treat these students more as 
employees than as students. One need only review the comprehensive 
factfinding regarding the Northwestern University football team to see that 
this is the case.8 With respect to sports funded completely by schools, there 
is no such incentive for schools to treat these athletes as anything but 
students. With respect to non-revenue generating college sports, the 
amateur ideal of the college athlete can and should be preserved and 
maintained. 
I. IT’S COMING: ELITE COLLEGE ATHLETES AS “EMPLOYEES”
A. O’Bannon Chips Away at the NCAA and Amateur Status of Elite 
College Athletes 
The door was opened by the federal district court decision in 
O’Bannon v. NCAA.9 Ed O’Bannon was an accomplished NCAA Division 
I forward for the UCLA Bruins from 1991 to 1995. One evening, years 
after his basketball career had ended, while visiting a friend’s house, 
O’Bannon saw his image on a video game being played by his friend’s 
son.10 The video game character was a perfect replica of O’Bannon. 
Wearing O’Bannon’s former UCLA jersey and number, the virtual athlete 
was a tall, slim, bald-headed and left-handed African American forward. 
O’Bannon initially felt “pretty fired up . . . [and] thought it was pretty 
cool.”11 Regarding lack of consent and compensation for the use of his 
likeness, O’Bannon forgot about the matter, “chalk[ing] it up as part of the 
system.”12 However, O’Bannon later came into contact with his longtime 
money for the college or university. At that point, as I argue in this article, the sport is invariably treated 
by the college or university as a commercial enterprise, and the athletes involved are effectively treated 
as employees. For these players especially, the NCAA defense that they are not employees will soon 
fall. That essentially means that college basketball athletes in the power 5 conferences should also be 
viewed as employees. The Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) Power 5 Conferences include the ACC, 
the Big 10, the Big 12, the PAC 12, and the SEC. These comprise approximately 65 football teams 
including Notre Dame, an independent, counted as an ACC school for Power 5 Conference designation 
purposes. See Full List of Division 1 Football Teams, NEXT C. STUDENT ATHLETE,
https://www.ncsasports.org/football/division-1-colleges (last visited Dec. 20, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/QH8B-GFYA]. 
 8.  See Northwestern Univ., 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P15781, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at 
*2-*9 (Mar. 26, 2014); Roberto L. Corrada, The Northwestern University Football Case: A Dissent, 11 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 203-07 (2020). 
 9.  See O’Bannon v. NCAA (O’Bannon I), 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 10.  See Villanova Univ., Examining O’Bannon v. NCAA, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgeyH5kSoF0 [https://perma.cc/5WK2-SKZV]. 
 11.  Id. 
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friend Sonny Vacaro, who asked him to be the named plaintiff in a lawsuit 
against the NCAA on behalf of former student-athletes. Vacaro worked as 
a Nike consultant in the late 1970s and was responsible for the marketing 
scheme paying coaches to put their players in Nike sneakers. Vacaro was 
involved in signing Michael Jordan to Nike and Kobe Bryant to Adidas.13
However, despite being a key player in the commercialization of college 
and professional basketball, Vacaro, a longtime opponent of the NCAA, 
left his position with Reebok in 2007 to challenge the association’s 
amateurism rules.14
O’Bannon and others filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA 
alleging that its limits on player ability to receive payments for use of their 
name, likeness, and image was a “restraint of trade” in violation of the 
law.15 The NCAA maintained that college athletes, as amateurs, are not 
employees in a labor market, and thus their limits are lawful. O’Bannon 
prevailed in the trial court.16 The trial court found that NCAA rules limiting 
player payments by commercial entities for the use of their name, image or 
likeness unreasonably restrained trade in violation of antitrust law.17 In so 
holding, the court made various findings related to the commercial nature 
of the transactions taking place between these particular student athletes 
and their colleges and the NCAA.18 According to the court, 
[w]hile it is true that many FBS football and Division I basketball 
players do not pay for tuition, room, or board in a traditional sense, they 
nevertheless provide their schools with something of significant value: 
their athletic services and the rights to use their names, images, and 
likenesses while they are enrolled. . . . The Seventh Circuit recently 
observed that these “transactions between NCAA schools and student-
athletes are, to some degree, commercial in nature, and therefore take 
place in a relevant market with respect to the Sherman Act.” The court 
reasoned that “the transactions those schools make with premier 
athletes—full scholarships in exchange for athletic services—are not 
noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a result of 
these transactions.19
Moreover, according to the court, elite college athletes are in a labor 
market for their services, one that prizes their ability to play football or 
 13.  Joe Nocera & Ben Strauss, A Reformed ‘Sneaker Pimp’ Takes On the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/sports/ncaabasketball/a-reformed-sneaker-pimp-
takes-on-the-ncaa.html [https://perma.cc/5QB8-LX64]. 
 14.  Id..
 15.  O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 955. 
 16.  Id.
 17.  Id. at 963. 
 18.  Id. at 988-93. 
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basketball for the school and a separate labor market for the use of their 
name, image, and likeness for use in TV broadcasts and rebroadcasts and 
for video games.20 The court stated, “the sellers in this market are the 
recruits; the buyers are FBS football and Division I basketball schools; the 
product is the combination of the recruits’ athletic services and licensing 
rights . . . .”21 Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs presented 
sufficient evidence to show an anticompetitive effect in a “labor market.”22
The trial court then formulated two remedies to address the antitrust 
violation by the NCAA. First, the trial court ordered that the NCAA could 
not cap the amount of grant-in-aid given to FBS football and Division I 
basketball recruits at less than the full cost of attendance.23 Allowing “cost 
of attendance” scholarships significantly changes the amount that athletes 
can be paid.24 Second, the trial court ordered that the NCAA could not 
prevent schools from depositing a limited share of revenues (up to $5,000 
per player per year) generated from the use of their name, image, or 
likeness into a trust fund that would payout upon the student’s graduation.25
The trial court’s decision was then upheld by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although one of the two remedies was struck 
down by the appellate court.26 According to the Ninth Circuit, 
the rules here—which regulate what compensation NCAA schools may 
give student-athletes, and how much—do relate to the NCAA’s business 
activities: the labor of student-athletes is an integral and essential 
component of the NCAA’s “product,” and a rule setting the price of that 
labor goes to the heart of the NCAA’s business. Thus, the rules at issue 
 20.  Id. at 991-92. See also Rock v. NCAA, No. 1:12–cv–1019–JMS–DKL, 2013 WL 4479815, at 
*11 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2013) (finding that plaintiff had identified a cognizable market in which 
“buyers of labor (the schools) are all members of NCAA Division I football and are competing for the 
labor of the sellers (the prospective student-athletes who seek to play Division I football)”); In re
NCAA I–A Walk–On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 2005) 
(“Plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient ‘input’ market in which NCAA member schools compete for 
skilled amateur football players.”). 
 21.  O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 991. 
 22.  Id. at 993 (emphasis added). 
 23.  Id. at 1007-08.  
 24.  See Marc Tracy & Ben Strauss, Court Strikes Down Payments to College Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/obannon-ncaa-case-court-of-appeals-
ruling [https://perma.cc/QW6L-5BJZ] (“The cost of attendance, typically several thousand dollars more 
than a traditional college scholarship, accounts for the financial demands of additional activities like 
traveling home and back and paying cellphone bills.”). 
 25.  O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. 
 26.  O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1049. Chief Justice Thomas dissented in part, crediting expert 
testimony in the trial court maintaining that the NIL fund payments to players of $5,000 was so small 
that it would not have an anticompetitive effect on the sport. Id. at 1083. Thus, Thomas argued the fund 
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here are more like rules affecting the NCAA’s dealings with its coaches 
or with corporate business partners . . . .27
Also, in finding that the NCAA’s limits on compensation violate the 
antitrust laws, the court necessarily held that the rules imposed by the 
NCAA are not “eligibility” rules, as the NCAA maintained, but restraints 
on commercial transactions governed by antitrust laws and requiring a Rule 
of Reason analysis: 
In other words, the substance of the compensation rules matters far more 
than how they are styled. And in substance, the rules clearly regulate the 
terms of commercial transactions between athletic recruits and their 
chosen schools: a school may not give a recruit compensation beyond a 
grant-in-aid, and the recruit may not accept compensation beyond that 
limit, lest the recruit be disqualified and the transaction vitiated. The 
NCAA’s argument that its compensation rules are “eligibility” 
restrictions, rather than substantive restrictions on the price terms of 
recruiting agreements, is but a sleight of hand. There is real money at 
issue here.28
The court’s finding is that these students are in a labor market and that 
their labor is part of a commercial transaction or exchange. The very strong 
implication of this finding is that these students are employees. The Ninth 
Circuit fell short of making such a finding, although it struck one of the 
district court’s remedies because it felt that remedy in particular crossed a 
line between viewing these athletes as students versus as employees. 
According to the court, the creation of a trust fund into which schools 
would put compensation for licensing a player’s name, image, and likeness 
went too far toward treating the students as employees.29 A number of 
other antitrust suits have been filed against the NCAA in the wake of 
O’Bannon. The Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA cases have been 
consolidated into In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation.30
These cases challenge the NCAA’s restriction on athlete compensation, and 
are currently scheduled to go to trial soon.31 These antitrust cases will not 
 27.  Id. at 1066 (emphasis added). 
 28.  Id. at 1065. 
 29.  Id. at 1079. “The difference between offering student-athletes education-related compensation 
and offering them cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. 
Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping 
point; we have little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit imposed by the 
district court until they have captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA will have 
surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and transitioned from its “particular brand of football” to 
minor league status.” Id. at 1078-79 (footnote omitted). 
 30.  In re NCAA Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, No. 14-md-02541-CW, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 52230 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2018). 
 31.  See Sam C. Ehrlich, The FLSA and the NCAA’s Potential Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very 
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be discussed in this article simply because they do not tackle the question 
of whether college athletes are employees head on. The O’Bannon case is 
the exception because the litigation there is completed and the trial court 
and Ninth Circuit findings do have some important implications, as 
discussed above, for whether these college athletes should be viewed as 
employees. 
B. The NLRB Implies and Expressly Urges that Elite College Athletes 
Should be Viewed as Employees 
At around the same time that the O’Bannon case was working its way 
through the courts, the Northwestern University football team filed a 
petition with the National Labor Relations Board requesting a union 
election.32 Later that year, the NLRB’s Chicago Regional Director made a 
determination that the players were “employees,” and Northwestern an 
“employer,” under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and 
directed an election for a unit of players who were recipients of “grant-in-
aid” scholarships.33 The Regional Director thoroughly analyzed the 
relationship between the elite college football players at Northwestern and 
the University itself in finding that the students were employees.34
Applying the common law definition of “employee,” “a person who 
performs services for another under a contract of hire, subject to the other’s 
control or right of control, and in return for payment,”35 the Regional 
Director (RD) easily found that Northwestern’s football players qualified as 
employees under the common law test: 
(1) Players perform services for compensation. The RD found that the 
football team hugely benefits Northwestern in a number of ways, 
including monetarily ($235 Million dollars over a 9-year period), and the 
athletes perform for compensation in the form of grant-in-aid 
Putting NCAA Amateur Rules to a Jury, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 13, 
2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/know-your-judge-claudia-wilken-putting-ncaa-amateur-rules-to-a-
jury [https://perma.cc/4EHV-PDY7]; Michael McCann, NCAA Amateurism to Go Back Under 
Courtroom Spotlight in Jenkins Trial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 2, 
2018), https://www.si.com/college-football/2018/04/02/ncaa-amateurism-trial-judge-wilken-martin-
jenkins-scholarships [https://perma.cc/DS2W-3M3H]. 
 32.  See, e.g., Daniel Uthman, College Athletes Take Steps to Form Labor Union, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/01/28/college-athletes-players-
association-northwestern-football/4958861/ [https://perma.cc/KL5B-P3LC]. 
 33.  Northwestern Univ., 2014-15 NLRB Dec. (CCH) P15781, 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221 (Mar. 26, 
2014).  
 34.  Id. at *38-67. 
 35.  Id. at *39-40 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995)); Brown 
Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490, n.27 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §2(2) (AM. LAW 





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
8 CORRADA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020 12:27 PM 
2020] COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ALT-LABOR 195 
scholarships (worth $76,000 per calendar year);36 and (2) Players are 
subject to the Employer’s Control. The RD details just how much these 
athletes’ lives are controlled by Northwestern University. Not only do 
they have to spend substantial hours engaged in football practice and 
play, their private lives are also controlled by the University, and, 
indeed, their student academic lives are also impinged by being on the 
football team.37
The RD distinguished cases involving graduate assistants.38 In 
addition to the RD decision in the Northwestern case, virtually all labor 
scholars analyzing the issue have likewise concluded that these elite 
college athletes meet the various legal definitions of “employee.”39
The NLRB has at least impliedly taken the position that college 
athletes are employees for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. 
On appeal, the NLRB in the Northwestern case, though refusing to assert 
jurisdiction in the case, did strongly hint that the Northwestern Football 
players may indeed be employees.40  The NLRB stated that parties and 
amici in the case largely focused on whether the scholarship players 
involved in the case are statutory employees.41  The Board also indicated 
that if the athletes were not statutory employees, the NLRB would lack the 
authority to direct an election or certify a representative.42 In fact, if the 
scholarship players were not statutory employees, the Board’s analysis in 
that regard would seem to be the much better way to end the litigation. 
However, the Board instead chose expressly not to decide the issue of 
employee status, instead opting to decline jurisdiction based on a tenuous 
line of cases arguably not supporting the Board’s ability to do so.43 The 
 36.  Northwestern Univ., 2014 NLRB LEXIS 221, at *41-44.  
 37.  Id. at *45-49. The Regional Director did find however that “walk ons” were not employees 
since they did not receive compensation. Id. at *49-51. 
 38.  Id. at *53-59. 
 39.  See, e.g., Richard T. Karcher, Big-Time College Athletes’ Status as Employees, 33 ABA J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 31 (2018); Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete Players Unions: Lessons 
Learned from Northwestern University and Potential Next Steps in the College Athletes’ Rights 
Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627 (2017); Cesar F. Rosado Marzan & Alex Tillett-Saks, Work, 
Study, Organize!: Why the Northwestern University Football Players are Employees under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301 (2015); Jay D. Lonick, Bargaining with the 
Real Boss: How the Joint-Employer Doctrine Can Expand Student-Athlete Unionization to the NCAA as 
an Employer, 15 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135 (2015); William B. Gould IV, Glenn M. Wong & Eric 
Weitz, Full Court Press: Northwestern University, A New Challenge to the NCAA, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 1 (2014); Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 65 (2014). 
 40.  See generally Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015). 
 41.   Id. at 1351. 
 42.   Id. at 1351-52. 
 43.   Id. See also Roberto L. Corrada, The Northwestern University Football Case: A Dissent, 10
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Board actually says in the opinion, “we have determined that even if the 
scholarship players were statutory employees . . . it would not effectuate 
the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction.”44
The Board’s reticence to decide the issue of employee status suggests 
some discomfort on the part of the Board to do so, perhaps suggesting the 
NLRB at the time, and particularly Member Miscimarra, feared the answer 
to the question might indeed be yes. Moreover, the NLRB’s decision to 
avoid the question left intact the Regional Director’s comprehensive 
discussion of the question as the Board’s only cogent analysis of the issue. 
Importantly, after the Northwestern case, the NLRB’s General Counsel, 
Richard Griffin, issued a Memorandum establishing that student athletes 
are employees for the purpose of enforcing unfair labor practices against 
the colleges and universities that employ them.45
The idea that athletes in revenue-generating sports like Division I 
football and basketball might be treated as employees while other college 
athletes would not be has been articulated in at least one federal circuit 
court opinion. Berger v. NCAA,46 a case brought by track and field athletes 
at the University of Pennsylvania alleging that the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA) required their college to pay them a minimum wage, held that 
the student athletes involved were not employees for purposes of the FLSA 
since they are amateurs not entitled to compensation. However, Circuit 
Judge Hamilton, concurring in the result in that case, explained that the 
decision might be different for athletes in revenue-generating sports.47
According to him, they might in fact be employees for purposes of the 
FLSA.48 As he explains, “I am less confident, however, that our reasoning 
should extend to students who receive athletic scholarships to participate in 
so-called revenue sports like Division I men’s basketball and FBS 
football.”49 Hamilton felt the outcome might be different in those cases 
because those sports involve “billions of dollars of revenue for colleges and 
 44.  Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. at 1352 (emphasis added).  
 45.  See Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B, on the Statutory 
Rights of University Faculty and Students in the Unfair Labor Practice Context to all Reg’l Dirs., 
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, N.L.R.B. (Jan. 31, 2017) (on file with the NLRB) (based on 
the record developed in the Northwestern University case and other public information, “scholarship 
football players in Division I FBS [schools] are employees under the NLRA”). This GC Memorandum 
was later rescinded by President Trump’s appointed General Counsel Peter Robb on December 1, 2017. 
See Memorandum from Peter B. Robb, Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B, on Mandatory Submissions to Advice 
to all Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, N.L.R.B. (Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with the 
NLRB).  
 46.  843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 47.  Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 48.  Id.





      06/12/2020   13:18:38
42394-ckt_95-1 Sheet No. 103 Side A      06/12/2020   13:18:38
8 CORRADA MACRO 1 EIC 5.4 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2020 12:27 PM 
2020] COLLEGE ATHLETES AND ALT-LABOR 197 
universities,” and therefore an analysis of the economic reality of that 
relationship “may not point in the same direction” as in this case.50
Hamilton suggested that in the appropriate case, with a developed factual 
record, the conclusion might be that there is in fact an employment 
relationship.51 Indeed, the extensive factual record developed by the 
Regional Director in the Northwestern University case seems to have been 
exactly what has caused the NLRB to lean in that direction.52
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id.
 52.  Interestingly, in a later FLSA case, Dawson v. NCAA, the plaintiff, Lamar Dawson, a former 
University of Southern California football player, does make the argument that college athletes in 
revenue-generating sports should be employees. In rejecting the argument, the District Court, without 
any analysis, simply cites a string of decisions rejecting the premise that revenue generation is 
determinative of employment status. 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407 (N.D. Cal. 2017). These decisions 
involved providers of in-home care for public assistance recipients, volunteers at dance music festivals, 
and student trainees at cosmetology schools. These employees and employers are hardly analogizable to 
Division I football and basketball players. First, the employers in these cases operate student training at 
a loss or are involved with state subsidies for public assistance. The dance music festival is a similar 
for-profit enterprise, but the volunteers involved in that case are more like those working refreshment 
stands at football games rather than the players themselves. In the dance music festival case, an analogy 
might be made to college football and basketball if the employees involved were the rock stars or DJs 
that are the focus of the event and that actually are the source of the company’s income. In any case, the 
decisions cited are inapposite on the question whether college football or basketball players are 
employees. In Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983), 
the court does not reject analysis of profit generation as important in determining employee status, 
rather the court says cases involving profit-seeking employers should not be automatically applied to 
public social service agencies.  The court’s analysis serves both to distinguish the case from being 
applied to college students especially at private institutions but also to suggest that profit may indeed be 
an important factor in assessing economic reality. In Valladares v. Insomniac, Inc., No. EDCV 14-
00706-VAP (DTBx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190028, at *24–27 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2015), the court 
explains that revenue generation is irrelevant to deciding whether the employer in the case, Insomniac, 
Inc., falls under the Amusement or Recreational Exemption (ARE) to the FLSA. The focus for that 
exemption is the intermittency of the events run by employers, not revenue generation. The case is 
completely inapposite to the question of the employment relationship between colleges, the NCAA and 
college football and basketball players. The last two cases cited by the court involve student trainees at 
a cosmetology school’s cosmetology clinic. In Jochim v. Jean Madeline Educ. Ctr. Education Center of 
Cosmetology, Inc., the court found that a student trainee in a cosmetology clinic is not an employee 
despite the school’s alleged profit from student labor. According to the court, “[t]he economic reality of 
the relationship was that [the plaintiff] paid the [s]chool tuition in exchange for an education in 
cosmetology, and a significant part of her education included working in [the cosmetology school[‘s] 
clinic as a student.” 98 F. Supp. 3d 750, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2015). None of these situations has anything to 
do with college football and basketball players on revenue-generating teams. The legal statements in 
these cases about the profitability of the employer involved are inapposite and inapplicable to the issue 
of profit generation in the context of a revenue-generating college football or basketball team because 
the parts of the FLSA involved are not the same. Nor can these college athletes be analogized to student 
trainees, volunteers at dance music festivals, or public social service workers. College football and 
basketball players in Division I and FBS schools are at the very heart of the commercial enterprise 
involved. The better they play, the more money, in the millions, the school makes. Any test labelled an 
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C. Emerging State Legislation Related to Elite College Athlete Pay 
and the NCAA’s Response: O’Bannon Matures and Another Step is Taken 
toward College Athlete “Employee” Status 
On September 9, 2019, the California Assembly passed a bill, SB 206 
“The Fair Pay to Play Act,” allowing student athletes in California colleges 
to hire agents and be paid for the use of their name, image, or likeness.53
The bill also prohibited colleges from taking away scholarships of players 
who are paid for their name, image, or likeness.54 Not too long after the 
California law, Florida, too, took up similar legislation.55 As a 
consequence, the NCAA very recently agreed to allow college athletes to 
earn money for name, image, likeness rights while adamantly maintaining 
college athletes are not employees.56 While the NCAA announced that it 
will allow athletes to benefit from the use of their name, image, likeness, 
probably to forestall any further state legislation, the NCAA has not yet 
developed a plan to allow those payments.57 The NCAA Board of 
Governors has “directed each of the NCAA’s three divisions to create the 
necessary new rules and have them in place by 2021.”58 It is hard to 
imagine what rules the NCAA might devise that will not further dilute their 
claim that student athletes in revenue generating sports are amateurs and 
not employees of a college or university. The Ninth Circuit, in striking 
down a proposed fund that would make name, image, likeness payments to 
student athletes upon graduation, in the O’Bannon case, said the following: 
The difference between offering student-athletes education-related 
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational 
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we 
see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined 
stopping point; we have little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to 
challenge the arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they have 
captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA will have 
 53.  See Berkowitz, supra note 5.  
 54.  Wolf, supra note 5. 
 55.  See Calvan, supra note 6. The Florida proposed legislation is modelled after California’s. The 
biggest football states are likely to follow since none of them wants to cede a recruiting advantage. 
Indeed, as of the time of the writing of this article, bills modeled on California’s have been passed or 
proposed in Illinois, New Jersey, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Not surprisingly, the NCAA was quick to 
change course after the possibility of Florida legislation was announced. See Russo, supra note 6. The 
NCAA Board of Governors will allow student athletes to receive pay for use of their NIL. However, the 
NCAA Board “is emphasizing that change must be consistent with the values of college sports and 
higher education and not turn student-athletes into employees of institutions. Id.
 56.  See Russo, supra note 6.  
 57.  Id.
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surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and transitioned from its 
“particular brand of football” to minor league status.59
II. COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY “WORK-STUDY” PROGRAMS AS A 
TEMPLATE FOR PAYING ELITE COLLEGE ATHLETES
A. The Federal Work Study Program 
1. Overview 
The Federal Work-Study Program provides college students the 
opportunity to earn up-to an awarded amount based on their financial 
need.60 The goal of the program is to help both undergraduate and graduate 
students pay for their education expenses.61 While the program encourages 
students to work in community focused placements or in their field of 
study, students are not limited to those jobs.62 Students may work at either 
on-campus or off-campus placements.63 In determining a student’s work 
placement the following factors are relevant: (1) “the student’s financial 
need”; (2) “the number of hours per week the student can work”; (3) “the 
period of employment”; (4) “the anticipated wage rate”; and (5) the 
“amount of other assistance available to the student.”64 These same factors 
 59.  O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1078-79. The only real strategy for the NCAA might be to cut its 
losses in the way suggested in this article. Separate college athletes in revenue generating sports 
programs from the rest. For these athletes there should be a robust program of compensation across the 
three categories of earnings delineated by the trial court in the O’Bannon case: 1) Use of NIL in live 
game telecasts; 2) Use of NIL in Video Games; and 3) Use of NIL in Game Rebroadcasts, 
Advertisements, and Other Archival Footage. See O’Bannon I, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 968-71. The great bulk 
of these monies, one would imagine, would go to athletes and teams in Division I college basketball and 
FBS college football Power 5 Conferences. Some residual amount may go to other colleges in the 
context of live game telecasts and rebroadcasts (for example, when the occasional DIII or DII team 
plays a college powerhouse). These might be placed in some sort of escrow account and paid to 
students in non-revenue generating programs upon graduation while the others, acknowledged 
employees, would receive real-time payments from the schools along with work study checks for their 
labor on the college football or basketball team. The amateurism argument made with respect to athletes 
in non-revenue generating sports may have a chance of prevailing. Despite payments out of these funds 
to “employees,” the NCAA may still be able to justify substantial caps on payments, limiting payments 
to smaller amounts like $5,000 (or even capping wages at the minimum wage level) on the theory that 
these restraints may be procompetitive, as Chief Justice Thomas argued in his dissent in O’Bannon,
crediting expert testimony in the trial court on this point. 
60. Federal Work-Study Jobs Help Students Earn Money to Pay for College or Career School,
U.S. DEP’T EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/work-study [https://perma.cc/P825-L3WJ] 
[hereinafter FWS Jobs Help Students Earn Money] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).  
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63. Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., The Federal Work-Study Program, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 6-39 (2018), 
https://ifap.ed.gov/fsahandbook/attachments/1819FSAHdbkVol6Ch2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6PB-
G9Z8]. 
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must be considered when determining the amount of a student’s award.65 A 
student’s financial award letter dictates the number of hours that the student 
may work.66 On average, students work between nine and twenty hours per 
week with most schools barring students from working over twenty hours 
per week.67 Students are given the freedom to work multiple jobs with their 
work-study award, although, they have to split their awarded number of 
hours between each job.68
Students are allowed to work during periods which they are not 
enrolled in classes including over summer or Christmas break.69 However, 
the student must be enrolled or planning to enroll during the next period of 
enrollment.70 If a student fails to attend that next period of enrollment, the 
school must be able to show that “the school had reason to believe the 
student intended to study at that school in the next period of enrollment.”71
2. Funding 
The federal government subsidizes the Federal Work-Study Program 
by providing up-to 75% of the wages paid to students.72 Schools and/or 
employers must pay the remaining 25% of the students’ wages, however, 
they may choose to pay up to 50%.73 In the case of placements with off-
campus, for-profit jobs, the Federal Work-Study Program may only provide 
up-to 50% of the students’ wages.74 Schools are also barred from providing 
more than 25% of the total amount allocated to them for the year at for-
profit placements.75 These ratios vary from school to school. For example, 
at Stanford, the school and the federal government subsidize 90% of the 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Federal Work Study, CORNELL UNIV., https://studentemployment.cornell.edu/federal-work-
study (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/UB9K-VKDT]. 
 67.  Id.; Student Emp. Off., How Many Hours May a Student Work?, BATES C., 
https://www.bates.edu/student-employment/for-supervisors/policies/how-many-hours-may-a-student-
work/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/8NRB-AES2]; 2018-19 Term-Time Federal Work-
Study Program Application, HARV. MED. SCH., https://meded.hms.harvard.edu/files/hms-med-
ed/files/term-time_fws_application_2018-19.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4WRN-
BJ53]. 
 68.  Student Emp. Off., Federal Work Study Program, HARV. UNIV., 
https://seo.harvard.edu/federal-work-study-program (last visited Dec. 16, 2019)  
[https://perma.cc/7JY7-UYC4]. 
 69.  Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROGRAMS: FEDERAL WORK-STUDY (FWS) PROGRAM,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/fws/index.html [https://perma.cc/A5BH-QNUF]. 
 73.  CORNELL UNIV., supra note 66. 
 74.  Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63. 
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students’ wages in non-profit placements and the employer covers the 
remaining 10%.76 In contrast, at Harvard Medical School, the school and 
federal government subsidize 70% of the students’ wages and the employer 
covers the remaining 30%.77 Schools can pay their share of the wages from 
their own funds or from outside sources including off-campus employers.78
The federal funds are not allowed to be used to provide “fringe 
benefits” such as sick leave, paid-time off, or workers compensation.79
However, schools can use their own funds to provide such benefits to 
students.80 Another limitation on the use of federal funds, is that at least 7% 
of the federal funds allocated to a school in a given year must be used to 
pay students in community service jobs.81 Also, a minimum of one student 
per year must be employed as either a reading tutor or in a family literacy 
project.82 Schools may request waivers for these requirements, however, 
the difficulty of placing a student in one of these roles or in community 
service placements generally may not be the basis for a waiver.83 Further, if 
schools pay for their share of the federal work-study program through non-
cash sources such as books, tuition, fees, etc., the school can pay a federal 
work-study student through credit on their school account without written 
authorization from the student.84
3. Wages 
The program mandates that students are paid at least minimum wage, 
though some schools pay students upwards of $19/hour.85 If the state or 
local minimum wage is higher than the federal minimum wage, schools are 
held to the state or local minimum wage.86 The Federal Student Aid 
Handbook specifically dictates that while the Small Business Job 
 76.  STANFORD UNIV., HAAS CENTER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: COMMUNITY SERVICE WORK-
STUDY), https://haas.stanford.edu/students/cardinal-quarter/community-service-work-study-csws 
[https://perma.cc/Y6LD-HM26]. 
 77.  HARV. MED. SCH., supra note 67. 
 78.  See Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63.  
 79.  Id. at 6-47. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 6-57. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 6-58. 
 84.  Id. at 6-51.  
 85.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL WORK-STUDY (FWS) PROGRAM,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/fws/index.html [https://perma.cc/DDR2-CL78] (last modified Apr. 17, 
2014); Haas Ctr. for Pub. Serv., Community Service Work-Study (CSWS), STAN. U., 
https://haas.stanford.edu/students/cardinal-quarter/community-service-work-study-csws 
[https://perma.cc/7VVZ-3EKX] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).  
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Protection Act of 1996 allows employers to pay wages under the federal 
minimum wage when individuals are in training, schools may not pay 
students less than minimum wage under this law.87 A student may receive 
academic credit for his or her work-study position, however, students may 
not receive less pay than they would if they were not receiving credit.88 The 
only circumstance under which a student may be paid less than minimum 
wage is if the student is receiving academic credit for the work-study 
position, and the employer would not normally pay someone for the same 
job.89 Similarly, a student cannot be paid if they are “receiving instruction 
in a classroom, laboratory, or other academic setting.”90
When deciding a student’s wages, schools must use the following 
factors: (1) “the skills needed to perform the job”; (2) “how much persons 
with those skills are paid in the local area for doing the same type of job”; 
(3) “rates the school would normally pay similar non-FWS employees”; 
and (4) “any applicable federal, state, or local laws that require a specific 
wage rate.”91 Schools are not allowed to base or determine a student’s 
wage rate on financial need.92 Further, “if a student’s skill level depends on 
his or her academic advancement, the school may pay a student on that 
basis.”93  In most cases, though, a student who is performing comparable 
work to an employee should be paid a comparable amount.94 The wages 
students are paid for work-study are taxable income and, thus, students are 
required to report work-study wages on their annual income forms.95
Students must be paid hourly, with the exception of graduate students who 
can be salaried employees.96 Further, the school is required to pay students 
directly at least once a month.97 Federal work-study compensation can be 
paid directly to a student through an electronic funds transfer, by issuing a 
check (or a similar method), or if the student has given written 
authorization, the school can credit the payment to the student’s account.98
 87.  Id.
 88.  Id. at 6-44. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 6-46. 
 92.  Id. at 6-47. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Off. Fin. Aid & Student Emp., Your FWS Earnings, CORNELL UNIV., 
https://studentemployment.cornell.edu/federal-work-study/your-fws-earnings [https://perma.cc/BV4L-
5SH6] (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
 96.  FWS Jobs Help Students Earn Money, supra note 60. 
 97.  Id. 
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However, if a credit to a student’s account exceeds the amount the student 
owes in the account, the school must pay the student the remaining balance 
directly as soon as possible or at the most, 14 days after the account 
showed a credit balance.99 “Regardless of who employs the student, the 
school is responsible for making sure the student is paid for work 
performed.”100 Because work-study students are deemed employees either 
of the university or of whatever employer the student works for, they are 
eligible for worker’s compensation among other benefits.101
Students may be paid for training and travel related to their work-
study positions.102 Regardless of the job type, federal work-study students 
can be paid up to around 20 hours of training time as well as time for 
ongoing preparation and evaluations that are “needed to accomplish” their 
work-study jobs.103 Further, students may be compensated for “a 
reasonable amount of time for travel that is directly related to employment 
in community service activities.”104 Although, schools are encouraged to 
have students log their travel time separately from their work-time.105
B. Work-Study’s Applicability to College Athletes in Revenue-
Generating Sports 
1. Accommodating Revenue-Generating College Athletes within the 
definition of Employee under FLSA for the purpose of Work-Study 
A number of payment mechanisms for college athletes have been 
proposed over the years by scholars.106 They are by and large clever and 
certainly worth thinking about, but all of them would require creation of a 
 99.  Id. at 6-52. 
 100.  Id. at 6-46. 
 101.  U. Iowa, Handling Work-Related Injuries of Work-Study Employees, OFF. STUDENT FIN. AID,
https://financialaid.uiowa.edu/studentemployment/employers/employers/injuries (last visited Dec. 16, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/DL53-W6NR]. 
 102.  Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-55.
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Employee-Athletes, Antitrust, and the Future of College 
Sports, 28 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 245, 271-72 (2017); David A. Grenardo, The Duke Model: A 
Performance Based Solution for Compensating College Athletes, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 157, 163-64 
(2017); William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism: Saving Intercollegiate Athletics Through 
Conference Athlete Revenue-Sharing, 68 ALA. L. REV. 551, 556 (2016); Roger M. Groves, A Solution 
for the Pay for Play Dilemma of College Athletes: A Novel Compensation Structure Tethered to 
Amateurism and Education, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 101, 117 (2016); Michael N. Widener, 
Compensating College Athletes in “Store Credit,” 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 431, 436-38 (2016); Thomas R. 
Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical Obstacles, 7 VILL. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 55, 78-82 (2000); C. Peter Gopelrud, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More than 
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new administrative structure independent of current college and university 
organization. However, the Federal Work Study program can serve as an 
effective template for paying elite college athletes for their “work” on the 
playing field. Since the work study program exists within each university 
and has a history that would provide answers or solutions to almost any 
wrinkle or complication that might arise in the context of paying college 
athletes, it can easily be adapted to this end. 
Indeed, a trio of cases brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA) have analogized college athlete participation in their respective 
college sports to work done by students on campus as part of the federal 
work study program. These three cases, the aforementioned Berger v. 
NCAA,107 Dawson v. NCAA,108and Livers v. NCAA,109 all involved college 
athletes suing their respective colleges and universities for failing to pay 
them the minimum wage for their “work” on the athletic field of play. In 
Berger, two former women’s track and field stars, Gillian Berger and 
Taylor Hennig, were the lead plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against the 
NCAA along with the University of Pennsylvania (their alma mater) and 
over 120 other NCAA Division I colleges and universities.110 In Dawson,
the lead plaintiff in another class action suit, Lamar Dawson, had been a 
college football player for the University of Southern California (USC). He 
sued not only the NCAA but also the PAC 12 Conference (USC is a 
member of the PAC 12).111 In Livers, plaintiff “Poppy” Livers, pursuing an 
FLSA claim by himself against the NCAA and Villanova University, was a 
former Division I football player at Villanova.112
The reason that the federal work study program is referenced in all of 
these lawsuits is that the Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook 
(FOH) defines federal work study students as “employees” for purposes of 
federal employment laws like the FLSA, and, simultaneously, defines 
college athletes as those involved in extracurricular activities who should 
not be viewed as employees and thus receive no pay.113 Section 10b24(b) 
defines circumstances in which an employment relationship will exist 
between colleges and students.114 In that subsection, students who 
 107.  843 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 108.  250 F. Supp. 3d 401 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 109.  No. 17-4271, 2018 WL 3609839 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
110.    843 F.3d at 289. 
 111.  250 F. Supp. 3d at 402-03. 
 112.  2018 WL 3609839, at *1. 
 113.  See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK  §10(b)(24)(b) (March 31, 2016), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf [hereinafter FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK]. See also 
Berger, 283 F.3d at 292-93; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406-407; Livers, 2018 WL 3609839 at *3-*4. 
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participate in work study programs  are generally considered “employees” 
for FLSA purposes. “[A]n employment relationship will generally exist 
with regard to students whose duties are not part of an overall educational 
program and who receive some compensation. Thus, students who work at 
food service counters or sell programs or usher at athletic events, or who 
wait on tables or wash dishes in dormitories in anticipation of some 
compensation (money, meals, etc.) are generally considered employees 
under the Act.”115
By contrast, Section 10b24(a) of the FOH states, “University or 
college students who participate in activities generally recognized as 
extracurricular are not considered to be employees within the meaning of 
the Act.”  Section 10b03(e) defines extracurricular activities as: 
activities in connection with dramatics, student publications, glee clubs, 
bands, choirs, debating teams, radio stations, intramural and
interscholastic athletics and other similar endeavors. Activities of 
students in such programs, conducted primarily for the benefit of the 
participants as a part of the educational opportunities provided to the 
students by the school or institution, are not work of the kind 
contemplated by section 3(g) of the Act and do not result in an 
employer-employee relationship between the student and the school or 
institution.116
Thus, work study students working at a food service counter are 
employees because they are working to benefit the school and not 
themselves, while students employed in extracurricular activities benefit 
themselves and not the school.117
Any attempts by courts, the NCAA, and colleges and universities to 
argue that revenue generating sports like college basketball or football are 
there exclusively for the benefit of the students and not the school should 
be met with a considerable degree of skepticism. It may be true that in the 
1950’s and 1960’s all college and university athletic programs operated at a 
loss, and sports opportunities were provided by schools as part of an effort 
to educate the whole person and feed not only mind but body as well. With 
respect to substantial revenue generating sports like Division I college 
football and basketball, those days are long gone. Programs generating 
revenue in the millions of dollars have become a substantial source of 
revenue to fund many college programs. To say that a dishwasher in the 
school cafeteria is an employee, but a UCLA football player is not because 
 115.  Id.
 116.  Id. at § 10b24(a), 10b03(e) (emphasis added). 
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the dishwasher works for the benefit of the school while the football player 
does not is really the height of absurdity. The relationship between college 
football and basketball players and colleges and universities in revenue 
generating sports is clearly commercial in nature, and only incidentally 
academic and for the benefit of the student. This is proved by the Regional 
Director’s findings in the Northwestern University case118 and by the Ninth 
Circuit’s observations and conclusions in O’Bannon.119
A simple change in Department of Labor regulations will allow law to 
align properly with the economic reality of the relationship between 
revenue generating college athletes. The following changes should be made 
in the two provisions applying to the work study program. First, Section 
10b24(b) of the Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook should 
be modified to expressly acknowledge: “An employment relationship will 
generally exist with regard to students whose duties are not part of an 
overall educational program and who receive some compensation. Thus, 
students who work as athletes in revenue generating athletic programs or
at food service counters or sell programs or usher at athletic events, or who 
wait on tables or wash dishes in dormitories in anticipation of some 
compensation (money, meals, etc.) are generally considered employees 
under the Act.”120 Second, the Handbook’s definition of extracurricular 
activity in Section 10b03(e) should be changed accordingly. Extracurricular 
activities should be defined as: 
activities in connection with dramatics, student publications, glee clubs, 
bands, choirs, debating teams, radio stations, intramural and
interscholastic athletics (but not interscholastic athletics involving 
sports that generate revenue for colleges and universities) and other 
similar endeavors. Activities of students in such programs, conducted 
primarily for the benefit of the participants as a part of the educational 
opportunities provided to the students by the school or institution, are not 
work of the kind contemplated by section 3(g) of the Act and do not 
result in an employer-employee relationship between the student and the 
school or institution.121
2. The Alt-Labor Future: The Federal Work-Study Program as a 
Model for Paying Student-Athletes 
Modeling the pay structure for student-athletes after the Federal 
Work-Study Program (FWS), schools would be required to pay student-
 118.  See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.  
 119.  See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
 120.  See FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 113. Proposed modification to the existing 
language is highlighted in bold and italics.
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athletes at least minimum wage.122 If the state or local minimum wage is 
higher than the federal minimum wage, schools would be held to the state 
or local minimum wage.123 Schools would determine a student-athlete’s 
wages based on: (1) the skills required for the particular sport and position 
that the athlete plays; (2) how much other athletes with similar skills in 
similar positions are paid; (3) if the athlete was not a student, how much 
would the school have to pay for their position; and (4) if there are any 
additional laws at the federal, state, or local level that dictate the particular 
athlete’s pay rate.124 Schools would not be allowed to determine a student-
athlete’s wages based on financial need. 125 Schools could pay student-
athletes on a performance basis, however, they would still be required to 
pay the student at least minimum-wage.126 In most cases, student-athletes 
would be paid a comparable amount to non-student athletes of similar skill 
levels.127 However, this proposal envisions that student-athletes would only 
be paid minimum wage for their work study jobs as athletes. When the 
grant-in-aid scholarship monies are included as compensation (which will 
most likely be the case if these students are viewed as employees), then 
final compensation will be well above the minimum wage. 
Further, student-athletes could be paid for training and travel related to 
their positions.128 In such a case, student-athletes would be paid for their 
practice time as well as their travel time to and from various games and 
competitions.129 Student-athletes would also be eligible to be paid during 
times in which they are not enrolled in courses, but when they are doing 
work related to the athletic team they are involved with, such as over 
summer break when they might be working out or learning the playbook 
under supervision, as long as they are enrolled or are planning to enroll in 
courses during the next period of enrollment.130
 122.  Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-46. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. When deciding a student’s wages in the Federal Work-Study program, schools must utilize 
the following factors: (1) “the skills needed to perform the job”; (2) “how much persons with those 
skills are paid in the local area for doing the same type of job”; (3) “rates the school would normally 
pay similar non-FWS employees”; and (4) “any applicable federal, state, or local laws that require a 
specific wage rate.” 
 125.  Id. at 6-47. 
 126.  Id. The Federal Work-Study Program states that “if a student’s skill level depends on his or 
her academic advancement, the school may pay a student on that basis.” 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 6-55. 
 129.  Id. 
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Schools would have the option to pay student-athletes hourly or by 
salary, as long as they are meeting minimum-wage requirements.131 It 
would be the school’s responsibility to ensure that student-athletes are paid 
directly at least once a month, and only by written authorization of the 
student could the school pay a student-athlete through his or her student 
account.132 Even if a student does authorize the school to pay his or her 
wages through credits to his or her account, if there is ever a credit balance 
in the account, the school would be required to pay the student the credit 
amount within fourteen days of the credit appearing.133
Because student-athletes would be employees of the University, they 
would be eligible for “fringe benefits” such as sick leave, paid-time off, 
healthcare, and workers compensation.134 Therefore, if a school provided 
student-athletes with workers compensation and the student-athlete was 
injured, workers compensation would cover the healthcare costs related to 
the incident.135  Remember, fringe benefits are not federally funded, but 
provided by the school. This proposal also envisions that the funds for the 
program to pay college athletes in revenue generating sports a minimum 
wage for work study will come from the schools themselves, not the federal 
government, from revenues generated by the play of the athletes in their 
respective sports. This is entirely consistent with the current operation of 
the work-study program. The federal program contributes money to schools 
for work-study payments, but the government is not the sole funder.136
Schools often provide 50% of funds, and it would be entirely consistent 
with the program for a school to cover 100% of the wage cost plus “fringe 
benefits.” 
The payment of wages to student-athletes through the federal work-
study program may trigger a host of other employment-related obligations. 
For example, Title IX may require that student-athletes on some of a 
college’s women’s teams may also have to be paid work-study monies. 
Also, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and income tax 
obligations may be triggered.137 For these reasons, a study conducted by 
 131.  Undergraduate students in the work-study program are paid hourly while graduate students 
are paid either hourly or as a salaried employee. Federal Work-Study jobs help students earn money to 
pay for college or career school. See FWS Jobs Help Students Earn Money, supra note 60. 
 132.  Info. for Fin. Aid Profs., supra note 63, at 6-50, 6-46.  
 133.  Id. at 6-52. 
134.  Id. at 6-47. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  See supra notes 72-78. 
 137.  See Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 52-62; Omar A. Bareentto, NCAA, It’s Time to Pay the 
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William Gould and Glenn Wong in 2014 concluded that the only schools 
that may be able to complete a successful financial transition to a system in 
which student athletes are deemed employees at least in the short term are 
athletes in Division I Power 5 Conference schools.138
III. COLLEGE ATHLETES IN REVENUE-GENERATING SPORTS AS 
EMPLOYEES AND UNION MEMBERS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
COLLEGE SPORTS
A. The NCAA as Joint Employer 
The NCAA issues and enforces many of the rules governing college 
athletes.139 For any meaningful collective bargaining to take place, the 
NCAA would have to be a party in negotiations and a co-signer of any 
collectively-bargained agreement.140 The NCAA qualifies as a joint 
employer under any test that might be erected in a labor and employment 
context simply because of the substantial and strict control it has over 
college athletes. The current joint employer test promulgated by the NLRB, 
Browning Ferris Industries of California,141 was recently upheld by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit in Browning-Ferris 
Industries of California, Inc. v. NLRB.142 The new standard provides that 
“two or more entities are joint employers of a single work force if they are 
both employers within the meaning of common law, and if they share or 
co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of 
employment.”143 The new standard expands the joint employer test by 
allowing the Board to consider as a relevant factor in determining joint 
employer status: 1) whether an employer has “the right to control” the 
workforce beyond actually exercising control over it, and 2) whether an 
employer has “indirect control” over the workforce beyond exercising 
32-33 (2015) (maintaining that while athlete compensation might be taxed, payments in the form of a 
scholarship should not be due to an exception from gross income for “any qualified tuition reduction”). 
 138.  See Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 61.  
 139.  See Lonick, supra note 39, at 140, 162-64. 
 140.  I know I seemed to argue differently in an earlier article, see The Northwestern University 
Football Case: A Dissent, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 201, 218-23 (2020), but in that article I was 
simply arguing that the NLRB could have found Northwestern University to be the employer and the 
football players on the Northwestern team to be in an appropriate bargaining unit. Bargaining would not 
have been as meaningful without the NCAA involved, but the parties could well have reached 
agreement on any number of issues not conflicting with NCAA rules or the Student Athlete Agreement.  
 141.  32 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015). 
 142.  911 F.3d 1195 (Dec. 28, 2018). 
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“direct and immediate” control. The decision places in question Trump 
Board efforts to again narrow the joint employer rule since the Court 
refused to defer to the NLRB on the question of the joint employer test, 
claiming that the test requires an analysis of the common law of agency, a 
determination squarely to be made by courts. The Court then found the 
Board’s new 2015 standard to be consistent with common law principles. 
This means that the new expanded joint employer test is likely to withstand 
change efforts by conservative administrations. There is very little doubt 
that the NCAA is a joint employer under the new standard if athletes are 
“employees” and colleges and universities are “employers.”144 However, 
the NCAA is likely a joint employer under the narrower “strict control” test 
as well.145
B. Alt-Labor Future of College Athletics in Revenue-Generating 
Sports: Unionization and Collective Bargaining 
A future in which college football and basketball players in revenue-
generating programs will be employees will necessarily require 
unionization by these athletes and collective bargaining. First, without 
 144.  Lonick, supra note 39, at 163-64. (“Under the [new joint employer] standard, the extensive 
NCAA rules and university compliance requirements exemplify how the two entities ‘share or 
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.’ As a 
preliminary matter, many courts recognize that the student-athlete agreement itself is a binding 
contract. . . . It makes no difference which school a player attends because here, NCAA rules are 
inescapable. Put differently, all [student-athlete] laborers in college sports are bound by the [NCAA] 
contract. The student-athlete agreement and the 96-page NCAA Manual provides structure for the 
NCAA’s dependency on the student-athletes, which among other things, control the flow of benefits 
from athletes’ labor. . . . The detail of the NCAA bylaws is astounding, there are rules governing 
eligibility for participation in a variety of NCAA events, awards and benefits for enrolled student-
athletes, scheduling of athletic events, and enforcement principles which include both individual 
student-athlete and university punishments.”) (footnotes omitted).
 145.  Id. at 165-66. (“In summary, even without the new [joint employer] standard, the NCAA 
exercises the ‘strict control’. . .  to be a joint employer of student-athletes. The NCAA controls the entry 
to the workforce—via the Student-Athlete Agreement—and the terms of ongoing employment through 
its rules regarding eligibility. Behind its bylaws is a clear threat of action, which shows not only a 
‘right’ to control, but the NCAA exercising that right, as seen in countless cases against even the 
highest-profile athletes in college sports. Underlying these procedures is the economy of college sports, 
which depends on student-athletes agreeing to abide by NCAA rules and forces athletes to sacrifice the 
value of their skills on the open market for years. In the aggregate, these circumstances show the NCAA 
controls the field that student-athletes work in, and the purpose of the NLRA is served by finding they 
are ‘employees’ to the private ‘employer,’ the NCAA.”) (footnotes omitted); Edelman, supra note 39, at 
1650-51 (“Yet, even though arguing that the NCAA is a joint employer of college athletes represents a 
novel argument, there are myriad factors that point in favor of finding the NCAA to serve as a joint 
employer. For example, the NCAA bylaws require all FBS football and Division I men’s basketball 
players to sign an identical letter of tender, which includes their ‘terms of employment.’ In addition, the 
NCAA bylaws set forth uniform rules for financially compensating college athletes. Finally, the NCAA 
even has enforced nationwide rules pertaining to academic eligibility and drug testing—evidence of the 
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unionization of, and collective bargaining with, these athletes, the NCAA 
will not be able to sustainably weather what will be crippling antitrust 
liability. The NCAA rules set out in its Student Athlete Agreement and its 
96-page manual will not withstand antitrust scrutiny in its current form.146
Second, a collective approach through unionization and collective 
bargaining is likely the only way for the NCAA to contain and control what 
would be a wage war between schools. The federal work study program 
only sets a floor for wages (the federal minimum wage), but schools can 
pay students whatever they want above the minimum. In the cutthroat arena 
of competition by colleges, particularly in Division I Power 5 Conferences, 
for the top recruits in both football and basketball, wage competition will 
soar as soon as these students are deemed employees unless a containment 
mechanism in a collective bargaining agreement governed wage practices, 
much like collective agreements in professional football and basketball 
control overall player salaries in those sports. It is possible, though, that the 
NCAA could put caps on wages and compensation and argue that those 
restraints are necessary to maintain the popularity of football and basketball 
to the consumer. In other words, the restraints would be procompetitive.147
Those restraints could then possibly exist independent of the collective 
agreement. 
1. Process: What will be the Extent and Scope of College Athlete 
Unionization and Collective Bargaining? 
On the employee side, it probably makes the most sense for any 
college athlete union to be as big as possible in order to take advantage of 
 146.  See Michael H. LeRoy, How A “Labor Dispute” Would Help the NCAA, 81 U. CI. L. REV.
DIALOGUE 44, 45-46 (2014) (“In the long run, antitrust liability poses a bigger threat to NCAA interests 
than does player unionization. Therefore, it is in the NCAA’s interest to embrace the union-
representation process; engage in ‘hard bargaining,’ particularly because its bargaining strength is pitted 
against the weak bargaining power of college athletes; and anticipate implementing the terms and 
conditions of a collective bargaining agreement. By taking these actions, the NCAA would create a 
‘labor dispute’ with players—and, according to the strictures of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the 
Clayton Act, such a dispute would shield it from an injunction and potent antitrust remedies.”); 
Edelman, supra note 39, at 1655, 1660  (“The ‘non-statutory labor exemption’ is a court-created 
exemption from antitrust law that insulates from scrutiny certain concerted conduct in labor 
markets. . . . [I]t is unlikely that the unionizing of a single college sports team would derail an antitrust 
lawsuit against the NCAA in any circuit. Simply stated, applying the exemption would not serve its 
core, intended purpose of protecting collective bargaining. Meanwhile, the greater the number of teams 
within any particular bargaining unit, the more likely that the ‘non-statutory labor exemption’ would 
preempt antitrust litigation under both the Majority View and the Second Circuit View.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 147.  According to one of the experts at the trial court level in O’Bannon, the payment of small 
amounts of compensation to athletes should not affect consumer taste for the sport, and hence would not 
be anticompetitive. See, e.g., O’Bannon II, 802 F.3d at 1079 (Thomas, C.J., concurring in part and 
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the most leverage possible for any negotiations. Thus, most likely, any 
union suitor will try to organize one separate union involving all of the 
schools in the Division I Power 5 Conferences in football and basketball.148
On the employer side it might be a bit trickier. The NCAA would 
most likely want the biggest multiemployer unit possible, and that might 
mean that it would want to negotiate and have all the schools together. This 
would allow for maximum leverage and would in the end create a single 
collective agreement, just like in professional football and basketball. A 
multiemployer group including all the schools and the NCAA will mean it 
will be much easier to set a cap on wages as well as other subjects of 
bargaining like healthcare that would apply to everyone. The NLRB, which 
would arguably have either jurisdiction or effective jurisdiction over 
everyone, including the public schools, if the NCAA is a joint employer,149
has indicated, too, that it is concerned about labor stability in the context of 
college football and would favor a larger unit.150 However, the NLRB 
explicitly left open in the Northwestern University case the question of the 
size of the bargaining unit, emphasizing that even a single college team 
unit, like Northwestern’s, may be appropriate in the future.151
Nonetheless, given the money involved and the stakes generally, 
individual conferences and even individual schools might want to go it 
alone. While it is generally true that the Power 5 Conferences earn enough 
revenue through college football and basketball to be able to transition to 
an alt-labor world in which athletes are employees who share in program 
revenues,152 individual schools within those conferences and individual 
 148.  Intercollegiate basketball organizing might be a bit more difficult to predict since there are a 
few teams outside the Power 5 Conferences that are ranked each year and are perennial contenders at 
the NCAA tournament. Some of these schools, including, for example, Gonzaga and Xavier, might be 
added to any list for potential organizing by a college union. 
 149.  See Lonick, supra note 39, at 164-65 (arguing that the NCAA as a private employer 
controlling public and private colleges and universities may be viewed by the NLRB as a locus of 
control allowing the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over the NCAA and then through it to public 
institutions); but cf. Edelman, supra note 39, at 1648-49 (“If union organizers attempt to establish a 
multi-employer bargaining unit that includes all of the private colleges from within a single athletic 
conference (or multiple athletic conferences), the NLRB would likely have limited concern about 
‘stability in labor relations.’ Indeed, this approach would likely lead to either the separation of the 
unionized schools into an independent, sustainable athletic conference, or an agreement by the non-
unionized schools to voluntarily provide their athletes with the same terms of employment as schools 
where the athletes have the right to collectively bargain.”).  
 150.  See Northwestern Univ., 362 N.L.R.B. 1350, 1355 n.28 (Aug. 17, 2015). 
 151.  Id. at 1354 n.16; see also Edelman, supra note 39, at 1640. 
 152.  See, e.g., Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 58 (“However, it is important to note that the 
significant increase in revenues is already in place for schools in the Power Five conferences. This 
includes television contracts and revenues from the College Football playoff system. The schools in the 
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conferences within the Power 5 earn more revenue than others.153 Thus, 
individual schools and conferences may try to break away from the others 
to achieve an advantage in recruitment. To a certain extent this is already 
materializing with respect to the stipends schools may now award to 
student-athletes as a result of the O’Bannon case allowing schools to pay 
student athletes an amount beyond a full scholarship that reflects the full 
cost of attending college.154 One might imagine that a Notre Dame, an 
Alabama, an Ohio State, or a UCLA might well want to conduct their own 
negotiations and have their own agreement with players as to wages paid 
while signing on to any broad collective agreement for other terms and 
conditions of employment. So long as they pay more than the minimum 
required by any collective agreement, they would presumably be able to do 
so.155 Teams may splinter along conference lines within the Power 5 as 
well. For example, if the SEC is much more well-heeled than the other 
Power 5 Conferences, as one suspects they might be, it might choose to try 
to encourage the NLRB to find an SEC-wide unit to be appropriate for 
purposes of unionization and collective bargaining. As a result of this, the 
NCAA may possibly try to cap wages independent of the collective 
athletes (and this is without reducing the expense side of significant coaching salaries for coaches and 
staff, as well as significant facilities investments).”). 
 153.  Id. (“Beyond the twenty programs in the Power Five conferences that reported a positive net 
generated revenue in 2013, the remaining 100 or so FBS institutions will face significant financial 
challenges [in converting to a system where student-athletes are employees] likely to have a substantial 
impact on their athletic department revenues. This group of institutions includes most of the forty-five 
remaining schools from the Power Five conferences.”). 
 154.  See Jon Solomon, Alabama’s Cost of Attendance Stipend Will Rank Among Highest,
CBSSPORTS.COM (July 24, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/alabamas-cost-of-
attendance-stipend-will-rank-among-highest-in-nation/ [https://perma.cc/Y9G8-C5UD] (“Alabama’s 
cost of attendance stipends will rank among the leaders nationally at $5,386 for out-of-state players and 
$4,172 for in-state players, according to information the university provided to CBSSports.com. . . . For 
years, athletic scholarships have not covered what university financial aid offices list as the full cost of 
attending college. That changes this August when athletic scholarships can include not only the 
traditional tuition, room, board, books and fees, but also incidental costs of attending college.”). See
also Hank Kurz, Jr., Stipend is helpful, moral, necessary, Denver Post, Nov. 1, 2018, p. 7B; Will 
Hudson, Cost of attendance stipends show which sports colleges want to spend on, The Washington 
Post, May 22, 2015 (“The new “cost-of-attendance” stipends — money for gas, groceries, travel home 
and other similar expenses incurred by college students — are optional, and based on school financial 
aid office estimates. They vary widely between schools, but generally fall in the range of $2,000 to 
$5,000. . . . In and around Washington, how colleges are handling the stipends provides a microcosm of 
how this change is playing out across Division I, the financially disparate top tier of college athletics 
that includes wealthy powerhouses such as Texas and smaller institutions such as Howard. Many big 
schools in the so-called “power five conferences” are giving the extra spending money to all scholarship 
athletes, while some schools in smaller conferences are providing the stipends only to basketball 
players, or are declining to offer them altogether.”). 
 155.  See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (noting that individual contracts may 
add to, but not subtract from, collectively bargained contracts where there is great variation in the 
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bargaining agreement and take their chances with antitrust liability since 
they conceivably can argue that such restraints might be procompetitive. 
2. Substance: What will Athletes, Colleges, and the NCAA Bargain 
About? 
Speculation about what elite student athletes and their union would 
want to negotiate about is not difficult. In fact, for guidance, one need not 
look much farther than the collective bargaining agreement between 
players and the NFL or the NBA. The revenue picture is very similar 
between college and professional football and basketball. Revenues include 
ticket sales; broadcast and rebroadcast rights; name, image and likeness 
(NIL) payments; and merchandising money. The NFL and NBA 
agreements also deal with player salaries, including salary caps. Likewise, 
any college agreement will probably discuss wages and scholarships, and 
the colleges and NCAA will likely insist on a wage cap for students. This 
cap might be as low as the minimum wage, depending upon whether the 
NCAA imposes such a cap or how much students will earn from other 
sources of revenue like NIL income and broadcast revenue. The most 
recent NFL agreement in 2011 provided for less share for players of locally 
generated revenue and merchandising but a greater percentage of TV 
broadcast money.156 The NFL team owners were willing to share more of 
the money that the teams were not directly responsible for producing, like 
TV revenue.157 College teams might approach bargaining the same way—
allowing college athletes to keep more of the income coming from non-
team/school dedicated sources like TV revenue and NIL monies while 
keeping more of ticket revenue, concession revenue, and merchandising 
dollars. Whatever revenue is allocated to students can be used to fund work 
study programs that will result in wage payments to college athletes. 
Another area of possible bargaining will be in the area of healthcare. 
Healthcare concerns, including concerns about concussion protocols as 
well as the extent of medical coverage for college players, were the primary 
reason for the unionization effort at Northwestern University.158 Here, also, 
student concerns coalesce with professional player concerns, at least in 
football. In the 2011 NFL collective bargaining agreement, for example, 
 156.  See Katie Shonk, For NFL Players, a win-win only in retrospect, HARV. L. SCH. PROGRAM 
ON NEGOTIATION BLOG (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/win-win-daily/for-nfl-
players-a-win-win-contract-only-in-retrospect/ [https://perma.cc/BDN2-2AWS]. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  See Adam Gopnik, Team Spirit, NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014) (“The rationale for the 
players’ demands, which include concussion-testing, extended medical coverage, and more manageable 
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professional football players bargained for and received a neurocognitive 
benefit for players with concussions and other injuries159 as well as a 
decrease in the number of offseason practices160 and contact practices161 as 
well as the elimination of “two-a-days.”162 College athletes may also be 
concerned about drug abuse and the overuse of pain killers.163 They may 
well want these subjects addressed in any overall agreement. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, college athletes will likely 
want to bargain about education. First, the matter of their survival as 
students. As the record developed by the Regional Director in the 
Northwestern University case shows, these athletes are already controlled 
to a significant degree in service of their work for the football team. And 
that’s under the present system where they are at least symbolically viewed 
as students and amateurs. Imagine the incentives for the schools to trample 
educational objectives when students are viewed as “employees” and 
therefore “professionals.” There may be protections in some NCAA rules, 
but true protection of educational objectives and outcomes will likely flow 
from a negotiated agreement. In addition, roughly one-fifth of men’s 
college football and basketball athletes fail to graduate, and although that 
figure is much lower than in the past,164 it still might elicit concern by the 
players and their union.  They might well want a collective agreement to 
address the topic. 
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has maintained through an analysis of caselaw and recent 
developments involving states and the NCAA that the amateur status of 
student-athletes in revenue-generating college sports is no longer 
sustainable. The article discussed and analyzed what the future world of 
college athletes in revenue-generating sports as “employees” might look 
like, and in particular how such a world might be structured. The article has 
 159.  NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, 2011 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. 65 (Aug. 4, 2011). 
 160.  Id. at art. 21. 
 161.  Id. at art. 22 §5, art. 23 §6. 
 162.  Id. at art. 24. 
 163.  See Gould IV et al., supra note 39, at 61 (“Unionization at the college level could have a 
dramatic impact, although instead of athlete compensation, the true focus of bargaining may turn out to 
be player concerns that are developing at the professional level as well, such as safety, concussions, and 
the abuse of painkillers.”).  
 164.  See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI student-athletes graduate at record high rates, NAT’L
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shown that these student athletes can be paid through easy assimilation into 
existing college “work study” programs. The article has maintained that the 
transition from amateurs to employees will likely and necessarily lead to 
unionization and collective bargaining involving these particular athletes. 
In such a world, the NCAA, the Power 5 Conferences and the individual 
schools in those conferences will likely be “joint employers,” and there will 
be some issue about what might be appropriate bargaining units within 
which to bargain. The article ends by suggesting what might be the likely 
subjects of bargaining. 
Importantly, this article steadfastly maintains that this future world 
must necessarily be a bifurcated one. Most college athletes will and should 
remain amateurs. Colleges, universities, the conferences and the NCAA 
will not be able to sustain financially an administrative structure in which 
all student athletes are viewed as employees. Nor is it necessary. The 
incentives for colleges and the NCAA to treat students as employees and 
not students, I argue, only exist with respect to those sports that bring in 
critical revenues for the college. Those sports are men’s college football 
and basketball (and possibly some women’s basketball teams) primarily in 
the Power 5 Division I Conferences. Fortunately, the revenues from these 
sports are so substantial that they can fund additional payments to these 
students for their work in generating this income. The practical and moral 
arguments for extending employee status to students in sports that do not 
generate this kind of revenue are much harder to make. In addition, 
extending employee status to students in non-revenue generating sports 
may lead to the elimination of those sports. Men’s college football and 
basketball are popular enough to survive the change. 
